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It must be apparent to all that the conduct of a fiduciary business involves the
necessity of accepting the dictates of business and economic trends, not to mention
the changing status of the law. It was at one time generally felt that waivers and
disclaimers of liability would relieve fiduciaries of all liability except for gross
negligence and bad faith. This, however, is no longer the rule of conduct. The trend
is for both the statutes and the cases to ignore the existence of exculpatory clauses and
to hold corporate fiduciaries strictly accountable for errors both of fact and of law
and to impose upon them as a class a stricter rule of responsibility than upon individuals acting in the same capacities. The very fact that different standards of conduct may be expected of fiduciaries in different circumstances and under varying
rules of law makes the nature and the extent of their liabilities at all times very uncertain. Indeed, these may be said to be impossible of ascertainment until their acts
have been judicially reviewed in the light of circumstances existing at the time the
acts were committed. Even though upheld in their conduct fiduciaries may not
always be able to charge their legal expenses to the estate but may have to absorb
them in their own expense accounts.
Where modern business is confronted with serious contingent liabilities, such as
those with which the corporate fiduciary business is confronted in an ever increasiig
degree, the natural impulse is to look to insurance as a means of protection. Accordingly, it is pertinent at this time to raise the question whether corporate fiduciaries
in their capacities as administrators, executors, trustees under wills or personal trust
agreements, committees for incompetents, guardians and in their various agency
capacities, should seek to protect themselves by way of insurance against surcharge
or other claims. 'This is one of the questions for individual banks and trust companies to decide for themselves, and if their decision is in the affirmative to direct
their efforts toward making such protection more generally available than at present.
Before discussing the present status of such insurance for trustees and its availability to corporate fiduciaries in particular, perhaps it would be well to endeavor to
outline some of the problems to be met by insurance.
THE BASES OF SURCHARGE LIABILiTY

Corporate fiduciaries throughout the country have had in recent years the unpleasant experience of having to deal with surcharge claims and will as time goes on
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find themselves faced with more claims for alleged breach of trust in the performance

of their obligations as fiduciaries. They may also have to answer charges of
negligence in the performance of mere agency functions as variously conducted.
Claims made against fiduciaries in their various fiduciary capacities constitute what
are generally known as surcharge claims and indicate that the trustee has been or
will be charged in an accounting before a surrogate's court or in an orphan's court
for failure to perform its duties with the skill, prudence and diligence required by
the statutes or the common law in the jurisdiction in which the fiduciary conducts
its business. The claimant or claimants may charge breach of trust
(I) in retaining non-legals, unproductive investments, or speculative property in an
executor's or trustee's account; or in failing to sell securities in time to avoid tax
penalties;
(2) in purchasing for a trustee's account, with or without the consent and approval
of beneficiaries, investments of a class not permitted by the will or trust deed or
by the statutes and cases;
(3) in failing to properly diversify investments;
(4) in failing to correctly apportion or to make any apportionment at all of stock
dividends or of arrears of dividends or interest unpaid at the time of sale;
(5) in failing to correctly apportion the profit or loss resulting from the sale of foreclosed real estate, or overpaying life-tenants any income in excess of carrying
charges while the property is in foreclosure;
(6) in making overpayments to beneficiaries in any manner;
(7) in loaning money on mortgages in excess of the legal limits or on security
which turns out to be other than a first mortgage on improved property;
(8) in overlooking the existence of statutes affecting the conduct of fiduciaries in
particular circumstances;(9) in failing to seek instructions from the courts when, although veto power may
actually rest in the hands of a co-trustee or other person, it constitutes gross
negligence for the trustee not to act; or
(xo) in exceeding the authority given to the fiduciary through improper interpretation
of the will or trust deed.
The foregoing are only some of the likely allegations to be brought by the claimants and do not by any means exhaust the list of possible allegations involving surcharge claims. As a matter of fact, the claimants may even allege "fraud" under the
theory of tort liability for failure to fulfill the representations which the fiduciary in
its advertising may have held out with respect to any particular skill or special
knowledge it may have claimed to possess.
PRESENT STATUS OF INSURANCE AGAINST SURCHARGE LIABILITIES

Insurance policies as such against surcharge liabilities have not heretofore been
made available to corporate fiduciaries. Aside from the lack of any previous actuarial
or statistical experience, which alone constitutes an almost insurmountable difficulty
from the standpoint of any third party liability insurance business as now conducted
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in this country, there is at present no specific authority under which domestic insur-

ance companies can if they are so disposed undertake this new form of insurance.
It is a strange inconsistency but it is nevertheless a fact that, even though the willingness to undertake the business may somewhere exist, yet the specific authority is
lacking to permit insurance companies to underwrite the insurance of surcharge
liabilities even with the safeguards of the most careful selection of business and the
use of "deductibles" as a discouragement to careless practices based upon the existence of insurance. The defect in existing laws may sooner or later be cured by a
revision of the insurance laws'in the various states whereby casualty and bonding
companies may be permitted to underwrite third party liability insurance not only
against injuries to persons and damage to property as at present but against civil
damage claims of all kinds, including of course claims of the kind under discussion.
Until such time, however, as specified powers are given, no domestic companies can
undertake the insurance of surcharge liability claims without at least raising serious
questions of ultra vires. Nevertheless the trend continues in the direction of holding
corporate fiduciaries to a stricter rule of responsibility and liability than heretofore,
and the means should be made available at least to experienced and well-managed
corporate fiduciaries by which they can, if they wish, protect their stockholders and
depositors against loss by the purchase of insurance analogous in form to the insurance now generally carried by accountants and for many years carried by English
firms of solicitors. Until insurance of this sort is made available generally, the only
protection obtainable is in the form of service and indemnity contracts which are
available only to a very limited number of corporate fiduciaries.
ScoPE OF PRoPosm INSURANCE CONTRACTS

The underwriting of surcharge liability insurance must of necessity be surrounded
with adequate safeguards not only to prevent the abuse of the fiduciary relationship
through undue reliance upon the existence of the insurance but also to avoid cutting
off the insurance market altogether through the occurrence of the abnormally high
losses which would otherwise inevitably result.
Insurance should in any case take the form of errors and omissions insurancenot the form of an ordinary third party liability insurance policy in which the insurers agree to take over the defense and pay the judgment or settle the claim regardless of any wanton or reckless conduct. on the part of the insured. In this case
the insurance must of necessity exclude reckless conduct or at least make it impossible for .any fiduciary carrying the insurance to proceed without thought of the
consequences merely because protected by insurance. Nevertheless, it must protect
the fiduciary who in good faith unwittingly incurs a claim involving a breach of
trust. The test of the fiduciary's ability to recover should be: Does the act cqmplained
of by,the claimants or self-discovered by the fiduciary constitute a breach of trust
committed through the failure of the human equation, or through mistake of fact or
law, or does it result from a conscious and deliberate act or omission to act known in
advance to constitute a breach of trust according to the will or trust deed and the
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statutes and the finally adjudicated cases pertaining thereto? There should be no
question of the right to recover should the act or omission to act constitute an

unconscious or inadvertent act as distinguished from a conscious or deliberate act as

aforesaid.
While there may be some border line cases in which it may be difficult to distinguish between the two, there should not be much difficulty on this score provided
good faith is shown in the fiduciary's dealings with its insurers. The record of the

testimony before the referee in the surrogate's court having jurisdiction may clearly
show that the act or acts complained of, even though constituting a breech of trust'
toward the one class or the other making the exceptions, were committed in the
exercise of the defendant's sound judgment either without knowledge of the limitations imposed by the will or trust deed and the statutes and cases pertaining thereto,
or through an unintentionally wrong interpretation of these documents, or perhaps
through the doubtful status of the law as laid down by the courts. Otherwise the
proofs as in any other claim for recovery under an insurance contract must be based

upon the statements or affidavits of those directly concerned with the act or acts involved in the claim. If, upon the submission of satisfactory statements and after
reasonable investigation, it appears that the act or acts were "negligent acts, errors
or omissions" and not deliberate and conscious acts committed with full knowledge
of the limitations imposed, then the claim should be recoverable without further
necessity for submitting proofs of loss.
In no case, however, can the insurance operate in the ordinary manner of third
party liability insurance policies wherein the insurers take over the defense and have
complete control over the litigating policy to be followed. Instead, that control,
subject to reasonable restrictions upon the right to incur expenses or to make settlements without the authority of the insurers, should be left strictly in the hands of
the fiduciary to employ its own counsel and to determine its own course of action
in the light of circumstances as it deems best for all concerned rather than as the
insurers deem best for themselves alone. This does not mean putting the insurers
in the hands of their insureds with complete power to bind them to a course of
action without the right to be heard, but means merely that the initiative should be
left to the fiduciary to employ its own attorneys to investigate, defend or negotiate
for the settlement of any claim provided they at all times cooperate to the fullest
extent with the insurers' counsel and give consideration to any opinions expressed by
them. All reasonable disbursements and fees of the fiduciary's attorneys incurred in
connection with the claim should be considered a part of the loss with reference to
which such fees or disbursements are incurred, and the total should be added to the
amounts allowed the claimants in the 4djudication or settlement, if any is made,
subject of course to the deductible or first loss as expressed in the contract. In other
words, the insurer's liability should be for the claim as a whole; and the claim as a
whole should include whatever sum is actually paid in settlement and the reasonable costs and disbursements of the fiduciary incurred with the consent of the
insurers in connection therewith. This means in the case of a "self-discovery" the
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amount actually paid in settlement of the particular act or acts self-discovered and
made good with the consent of the insurers, and, in the case of a breach of trust
for which the fiduciary is held accountable by some court, the amount which the
fiduciary is directed to make good to the claimants as a class. This may mean the
life-tenants as a class or it may mean the remaindermen as a class, depending upon
whether the accounting is an intermediate accounting or a final accounting and
whether the claimants are life-tenants or remaindermen. While it is obviously necessary to place a reasonable limit of time upon the discovery of losses in the event of
cancellation or non-renewal of this type of insurance, there must be sufficient time
allowed to permit the fiduciary to account to the courts and so bring about a legal
review of its acts in the light of the circumstances existing at the time the action was
taken. Three years should be ample for this purpose because within that time
executors' accounts will have been reviewed in an executor's accounting and trustees'
accounts will be subject to at least an intermediate accounting. If the insurance is
renewed from year to year, or from one term of years to another, the protection
should be fully continuous from the date of taking out the first contract and thereby
permit recovery on claims made by remaindermen as well as by life-tenants.
BE INsuRED?
Insurance of this sort is obviously for the protection of the fiduciary and/or its
successors in business. It should only be available, however, to corporate fiduciaries
of experience and reputation. This means that the personnel in direct charge of the
trust accounts must themselves be equipped by education and training not only to
inspire personal confidence and to perform their individual duties with sympathetic
understanding of the problems of cestuis que trust, but also that they must be well
informed with regard to the pitfalls ahead of them and their employers through failure to use a proper record and check system on all of their fiduciary accounts and
to maintain the degree of control of assets and of expenditures required in the performance of their trust. Most important of all they must know the limitations upon
iheir authority with respect to the investment and reinvestment of the corpus and
the rules as laid down with regard to allocation of gain or loss between principal
and income. They must have competent legal advice in the shape of their own
counsel standing either at their elbow or instantly available to support their own
decisions in advance of their action or to advise them with respect to difficult legal
situations. They must have the benefits of sound investment counsel either within
their own organization or employed by them or by their trust estates individually.
Above all else the institution itself must have length of service and sufficient resources
to lend evidence of substantiality and to justify the confidence of the insurers in its
management and personnel.
WHO SHOULD

WILL INSURANCE ENCOURAGE CARELESS PRAcrICES?

One of the arguments against insurance of this kind is that it will encourage
laxity on the part of the fiduciary. This, however, is not sound logic. It would be
extremely unwise for any fiduciary because of the existence of insurance to relax in
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any way its careful attention to the details of trust department operation. This is
so not only because of the necessary existence of a deductible clause and the aggregate
limitations upon the liability assumed, but also because good faith requires the same
observance of the rules of conduct with insurance as it does without insurance. This
type of insurance can never cover a deliberate and conscious breach of trust, but
must be limited to the failure of the human equation to function in the manner
expected or, more particularly, against the uncertainties of the law and the possibilities
of adverse decisions affecting circumstances adjudicated in the light of previous
happenings which no reasonable man could possibly have anticipated.
REAcTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC

Insurance of this kind should not be used in any advertising or publicity, nor
should it be referred to in any way by bank officers in their discussions with prospective clients or- with beneficiaries of trusts. Its existence should not be known to
the rank and file of the fiduciary's personnel. It is obviously not admissible evidence
in court and cannot be used by the plaintiffs or their attorneys. In short, it should
merely be used as banks customarily use their bankers' blanket bonds and forgery
insurance, viz., as a means of recovery for losses actually sustained by way of claims
asserted or by way of self-discovered acts for which honesty alone compels the
fiduciary to make good without waiting for the claim to be asserted. It should not
react adversely upon clients or upon cestuis should its existence become known because in that case it should be referred to as a contract which prudently-managed
banks require for the protection of both their stockholders and depositors against
unreasonable demands and claims by dissatisfied or ill-advised cestuis. Its analogy
to accountants' liability and physicians' and surgeons' liability insurance should
invariably be pointed out to inquirers.
PUBLIC POLICY

There can be no serious question about the right to insure against civil damage

claims of any kind; least of all about the right to protect working capital against
the unfortunate consequences of litigation, however lacking the grounds for complaint may be in the final analysis. It is impossible to prevent law suits in our

country growing out of alleged breaches of trust in the conduct of fiduciary relationships because there are so many conflicting elements involved in the form of lifetenants, remaindermen, and special guardians and because access can be had to the

courts with little or no expense and with absolutely no requirement with respect to
the posting of security for costs--either court costs or costs of the opposing side.
Our own courts are not nearly so strict as the English courts in regard to the posting
of security for defendant's costs or so liberal with allowance of costs if successful, and

accordingly insurance is needed as much to pay the costs of defense as to pay the
amount allowed the claimants by way of damages for their loss. Dishonest and

criminal acts should, of course, not be insured but with these exclusions there are no
possible grounds for saying that insurance of this kind runs counter to public policy.

